10 Membranes

Britain and the EU

In all the analysis of Britain and the EU over the past few days I have been very surprised by the absence of historical perspective, because here is where the roots of the present situation lie. Europe and Britain’s divergent histories shape their present positions and, unfortunately in my view, make them ultimately incompatible. Both Europe and Britain seem to have an inadequate grasp of the others position, and a cold dose of history would help either side. 

What are the positions? On Britain’s side that national sovereignty is sacred; that loss of it to the EU is a catastrophic surrender. On Europe’s side that closer integration is a good thing for stimulating trade, preventing war and improving international strength and domestic living standards. In fact I believe both are true in their own way. Britain’s view is informed by the following macro-historical factors:

1.) The War(s): There is in Britain a narrative that, perhaps starting with the Armada, running through the wars of Spanish succession, the Napoleonic wars and culminating of course in WW2, Britain has always stood alone against European tyranny. One can essentially construct a nationalist history whereby Britain has repeatedly fought off one potential pan-European dictator after another. By far the most important piece in this story is WW2, incredibly still the defining moment of contemporary Britain where, despite sacrificing an empire and an economy, we heroically resisted the Nazis. It was a moment we all feel proud of, rightly, yet did lasting damage to the country and has proved a crutch we are unable to do without. Its legacy as been to leave the British with a sense that anything European is at some level tyrannous, wants to control, and that to compromise is surrender.  All the European conflicts waged over hundreds of years leave the British with a sense that to “submit” to the EU is not only a betrayal of Britain, but is too lose some eternal battle, to be ruled over, to be on the wrong side in WW3. Regardless of the facts, I believe this feeling animates much popular opinion in the UK, and also explains in large part the continued military alliance with the US. 

2.) The Island Nation: I don’t think it can be overstated what impact this has on British thinking, and is intimately connected to the points above and below. Geographic isolation leads to psychological isolation. While I couldn’t quite specify the mechanisms by which this acts, it has an intuitive force. 

3.) Parliamentary tradition: this comprises a number of threads, but broadly speaking is the political equivalent of fighting off tyrants. From Magna Carta, through the Civil war to the Glorious Revolution and the Reform Act, Britain, or at least England, has a tradition of reasonable liberty, when compared with peer nations, and a series of checks and balances internally. The freedom of Parliament has been consistently challenged, but has remained through those checks and through vigorous defence. A key element here is that famously non-existent constitution, a supple, changeable non-written Constitution that will bend before it breaks, and incorporates certain key guarantees on freedom and so on. These elements can be roughly defined as: a firm commitment to a loose notion of liberty; a powerful, relatively balanced Parliamentary tradition; a flexible yet iconic constitution; a basic political structure with an unbroken thread dating back a millennia. 

Put these three together and you have an ancient, deeply embedded Weltanschauung, that views any European initiative as a stealth attack on Britain’s liberty, a craven surrender to a new and megalamanical dictatorship. Britain is a very open country. We have sold all our best houses, and much worse, all our best companies to foreigners with hardly a squeak of protest. They do not fit into this narrative, and so it gets by; in contrast the EU is viewed as a latter day Napoleon or even Hitler, though no one says this explicitly, designed specifically to tear apart the autonomy and power of the Mother of Parliaments. And this time even the Channel won’t save us. 

On the Europe side there are several reasons why these conditions don’t pertain:

1.) Newer states: many EU states are “new” - Germany and Italy created from fractious agglomerations in the nineteenth century, Belgium and Greece slightly earlier creations from crumbling empires, many of the Eastern bloc countries newly emerged from communism or newly formed altogether. This doesn’t apply to states like France and Spain though. 

2.) Occupation: Virtually all the states of Europe have experienced occupation of one kind or another over the past two hundred years, often multiple times from many directions. Psychologically this contrasts with almost 1000 years of unbroken “home rule” in England, and gives European nations a different perspective on the EU, as a preferable solution to non-voluntary losses of sovereignty. It’s my hunch that if Britain had been successfully invaded from about 1800 on, we would be much more interested in the EU. Becoming part of a European state is not therefore surrender, but actually a clever strategic objective. 

3.) Absolutism: In virtually all European states, apart from some exceptions like Scandinavia and the Netherlands, absolutist, dictatorial or revolutionary rule has featured more centrally, and more recently, than in the UK. 

Given these histories, breathed in the air from birth, the present situation is understandable, and historically Britain’s position has been good for the Continent, in as much as it has been a useful counterweight to dominance from any one corner, for the good of all. It thus now views the EU as the new dominant corner to which it must be a counterweight, rightly or wrongly. 

This is mistaken for one reason - it reads the present as if it were history, and the problematics of history still purchased. They don’t. The world is becoming one of mega-blocs, like the nineteenth century, although spread throughout the world. The US (and NAFTA) and China are the most obvious examples, but India, Brazil, ASEAN and to a certain extent Russia and the Arab League, all represent regional super-blocs. The 21st century is likely to be about vast power centres, around which will float smaller free-wheeling entities like Switzerland, Hong Kong and Singapore. Britain is far, far too big to ever have a relationship to Europe like Switzerland; yet also far, far too small to be a serious player in this new age of Powers. Strategically our best bet is to be part of the European superstate, capable of acting with authority, securing the future for it’s inhabitants, this despite the messy, often thoroughly misguided and even damaging comprises that form the EU and it’s future. 

For the above reasons this will never happen. Mutual recognition of this fact is perhaps the best outcome of an otherwise disastrous summit. 

In many strange ways Britain is analogous to Japan, like Britain a small, indecipherable, fiercely independent archipelago sitting off an enormous continent to which it feels both superior to and fearful of; like Japan a country of enormous strengths and glaring weaknesses; and like Japan a country struggling to adapt to the new reality where it is not rich enough or powerful enough to stand up to the big boys, but not small enough to pass under the radar, too arrogant to accept either.